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Review Article
FROM MARKET MAGIC TO CALYPSO SCIENCE POLICY
by
 P. A. David
In the United Kingdom, the United States, indeed, throughout the community of
industrially advanced nations, a sense of urgency now surrounds discussions and debates
about the funding and conduct of R&D by government.  Decision-making concerned with
major public expenditure commitments in  many different areas has been held in the
tightening grip of fiscal stringencies, while  other, more specific circumstances have
combined to force a reconsideration of the proper nature and extent of the state's role in
furthering scientific research.  Since the ending of the Cold War, a variety of long-standing
practices through which governments supported the enterprise of science, have found
themselves the subjects of unanticipated critical re-examination.  Their exposure has been
made more severe by the stripping away of the "national defense" rationale that frequently,
and reliably had been invoked in former times; this was particularly true in the US, where
Congressional susceptibilities to arguments couched in terms of national defense had
wonderfully refined the art of wrapping that  loose-fitting garment around the efforts of
diverse coalitions seeking further support  -- from a wide array of public institutions and
government departments --  for basic as well as applied research activities, and for some
connected educational  and training purposes besides.
Within the past half-decade, however, the habit of linking government programs
supporting basic science in academic institutions vaguely with various conceivable, long-
term national defense needs, has been reduced to tatters -- not by the passing of the Cold War
ethos alone, but by swingeing cuts in public expenditures allocated for military and related
purposes, and the consequent shifting of defense agencies' missions towards the maintenance
of their near-term tactical capabilities.  In the ensuing scramble to protect many R&D
activities from the adverse political fallout, another candidate has been sought for the role of
general-purpose rationale.  "International competitiveness," "wealth creation," and even2
"national economic security," were already acquiring greater potency as generic political
slogans during the 1980s, when industrial producers in the US and Western Europe's high-
income countries found themselves confronting new and effective competition in
international product markets. Justifications for governmental support of a wide range of
scientific and technological research (and even some social and behavioral science studies),
accordingly, have now been re-cast by references to those even more vaguely defined
national economic priorities.
As a consequence of this conjunction of circumstances, a new host of new questions
have been raised, and some older sources of skepticism have been renewed.  These concern
the effects of  publicly funded civilian scientific research upon the current and future pace of
technological innovation, industrial productivity growth, and the resulting abilities of nations
to compete in the international economic arena.  How closely tied is commercially successful
innovation in the high-tech sector to fundamental scientific breakthroughs?  What is the best
mix of basic and applied R&D expenditures for the economy to maintain over the long-run,
and do the recent cutbacks of basic research funding by large corporations call for
compensatory adjustments in the level and distribution of public R&D support? How much of
the nation’s investment in research should be left to be financed by industry, and how
effective are broad instruments such as R&D tax-credits in inducing  extra private sector
expenditures for this purpose?  How large a share of the national product should we be
spending for R&D, and can one determine what are the right levels of funding for the country
to maintain across the variety of contending science and engineering fields? Do subsidies for
research on “critical technologies,” and  government programs of collaborative research with
industry merely pay for R&D that firms would do anyway -- but shift funding away from
basic, exploratory projects that need to be  underwritten completely by government grants?
Does it matter whether publicly funded non-military research is conducted in universities,
rather than by private non-profit institutions or government laboratories? 
Government ministries, departments, and agencies having responsibilities for the
initiation and administration of research programs in many countries are being urged now to
grapple with such questions; to rethink and re-evaluate their own performances so as to better
direct scarce resources towards new, and rather more explicitly specified societal goals. 
Thus, it is entirely conceivable that such  reassessments of the purposes, the funding criteria,
and the organizational modes for the pursuit of scientific knowledge, will amount to more1 Macmillian Press Ltd., and  Martin's Press, London and New York, 1996, 382 pp.
ISNB 0-333-56045 (hbk) 0-333-657-1 (pbb).
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than merely another fraught, but transient episode in the increasingly turbulent lives of
modern government bureaucracies.  For many of the advanced industrial nations  the R&D
policies and performance indicators now being shaped may well turn out to constitute a
significant departure from the main lines of the approach that became established in the West
after the Second World War.  From that refreshed policy watershed would flow a stream of
governmental and industrial decisions affecting the course of scientific and technological
developments well into the twenty-first century -- for better or for worse.  Where is one to
turn for information and insights to guide thinking about these complex and critical matters?
 Here, then, is Terence Kealey, a researcher and lecturer in clinical biochemistry at
the University of Cambridge, deftly summing up the spirit and contents offered to debates on
these questions by his timely book, The Economic Laws of Scientific Research:
1
"[R]elax. Economic, technical and scientific growths are free lunches.  Under laissez-
faire they just emerge, like grass after the rain, through the efforts of individual
entrepreneurs and philanthropists....Dr. Pangloss was right, this is the best of all
possible worlds -- or rather, it would be if only politicians left it alone....The Market
Place does not worship false Idols, it makes empirically correct judgements.  It is the
government funding of science that is an Idol of the Tribe."(pp.344-45)
That's right -- the central message is: ‘Don't worry’...get rid of government and ‘Be happy.’  
Dr. Kealey's rendition of this Calypso-style science and technology policy tells us just to end
all public support for civilian science (and university education, while we're are at it) and
everything will be not only well, but better!  The policy thrust of this book certainly can
claim to possess the virtues of simplicity,  clarity, and conviction.  Those, however, are not
qualities that can be said to characterize the reasoning that its author advances to support his
recommendations.  Indeed, the passage just quoted -- in which the efforts of entrepreneurs
and the capital outlays of philanthropic foundations are made to add up, somehow, to a “free
lunch” for society -- is emblematic of the muddled analysis and rhetorical excesses that
sustains Dr. Kealey’s faith in the magical powers of  “the market” to deliver the best of all
possible worlds,  in these affairs as in all others.  
The Preface to this passionate and prolonged polemic reveals that the project of
writing it was conceived well more than a decade ago, in 1984 to be precise, when (according2 There is a touch of irony in this. When Dr. Kealey  is arguing the positive side of his
case for laissez-faire in all matters of civilian R&D, the universally beneficial nature of
competition as a mechanism for resource allocation is taken to be axiomatic and unqualified. 
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to its author) Denis Noble, FRS, and other scientists at Oxford "helped orchestrate" rejection
of the proposal to award an honorary degree to the Prime Minister:
 "The Oxford academics claimed that Mrs. Thatcher was destroying British science,
but as I had been asked to leave Oxford in 1982 because of a shortage of space, I
knew their claims were false (our department's labs were only three years old, yet
money was so prolific they were already crowded.  Newcastle University, my next
home, had even newer labs, even more crowded...." (p. xi)
While there were some observers at the time who took the view that inasmuch as
scientists require proper space and equipment for their work, the nub of the problem --
particularly in the then rapidly expanding fields of molecular biology and biotechnology --
was the persisting inadequacy of  laboratory facilities in Britain's university research centers. 
Not so Dr. Kealey, who to this day can see only a surplus of academic researchers (whether
in Oxford, or Newcastle), a painful condition he blames upon the foolishness of excessive
State funding. The career difficulties occasioned for the author by the intense competition
among “too many” scientists for limited laboratory space along Oxford’s South Parks Road
are thus produced as testimony to the supposed mis-use of Britain's resources on a far grander
scale -- all of which can be laid at the door of the "nationalization" of science under
preceding Labor governments.
2 (pp. 187-192) 
These highly personal revelations fired a commendably ambitious undertaking to
delve into the economics and the history of science, technology and their connection with the
wealth of nations.  The resulting inquiries, as evinced by this book, unfortunately, were
unable to carry Dr. Kealey's understanding of these key issues in science and technology
policy much beyond the level of the insights he reports having extracted fourteen years ago,
in the unhappy circumstances of his displacement from the Oxford science scene.  That may
account for the fact that the work in question, although it is devoted to a most topical subject,
has a curiously dated quality: students of the British science and technology policy scene will
search its twelve chapters in vain for some notice of recent  debates, such as those over the
desirability of the 1992 White Paper’s commitment to public research planning exercises like
Project Foresight, or the impact of sharp cutbacks in British government funding for5
university research equipment budgets, or the wisdom of an institutional and administrative
structure that  places the Research Councils (whose responsibility it is to allocate funds for
basic science) inside the Department of Trade and Industry.  Such omissions could be
forgiven on the grounds that these are merely the ephemera of contemporary science and
technology policy.  But this work has even less to offer in the way of generic and enduring
principles for the practical  guidance of those charged with responsibilities for allocating
R&D resources between programmes, projects and competing organizations, whether in the
private or the public sectors.  Operational decision-making there repeatedly confronts
questions involving the nature of the criteria and terms on which research programs and
projects are to be funded, the locus of control over research agendas, and the disposition of
the resulting research findings.  These are intricate matters of balance and degree, and their
elucidation calls for careful attention to the facts and even greater caution in  interpretation, 
not dogmatic choices between the ideological extremes of laissez-faire or planning.  The
author of The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, however, displays little interest in the
former, and is much preoccupied by questions of the latter variety.
This is a pity, particularly because he has not stinted in the efforts devoted to
researching and presenting his brief.  The book’s first six chapters evince Dr. Kealey’s
devotion to reading widely in the secondary historical sources on economic development,
science and technology, starting in classical antiquity and proceeding through the Industrial
Revolution.  Chapters  7 and 8 follow the story into modern times,  displaying the author’s
familiarity with the main outlines of British and US government policies affecting science
and technology, and university education, since World War II.  In Chapters 9 and 10, entitled
“The Economics of Research,” and “The Real Economics of Research,” respectively,  Dr.
Kealey shows he has acquainted himself with some standard items in the  analytical
economics literature relating to R&D investment, and goes to the lengths of essaying  some
econometric analyses of OECD comparative international statistics pertaining to R&D
funding during the 1980s.  The latter constitute the core of the book’s positive empirical
arguments, specifically those claiming that the effects of eliminating all public funding for
non-military R&D would be beneficial even to the enterprise of science, as well as for
national economic growth. Chapter 11 continues in the quantitative mode by mobilizing an
assortment of biblio metric indicators (rates of publication of scientific papers, and citations)
to uphold the negative part of the author’s argument -- an attack upon the claims made on3 See The Economist (London Edition, 14 September 1996).   The Daily Telegraph’s
(3 July 1996) iconoclastic columnist, Matt Ridley, reviewing Dr. Kealey’s book under the
headline “Help science--don’t give it any more money,”described it in these words: ”This is
one of the most intelligent, trend-changing and courageous books I have ever read.  If only
his publisher had made more of an effort -- the book is littered with typing errors, saddled
with a deadly title and gives no clue to the excitement of its contents -- it would be an instant
best-seller.”
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various occasions during the past twenty-five years that actual or contemplated cutbacks in
government support of basic research would bring about the “decline” of science in Britain,
or in the US, as the case might be.  Although the presentation is somewhat discursive, rather
than systematic, and the argument at times becomes rather repetitive, Dr. Kealey marshals all
this material, and advances his interpretations with a verve that imparts to the text a quality
that is undeniably engaging.
But, and it is a very big "but", indeed, the evidence, analysis, and interpretations put
forth in this volume are so deeply flawed that the easy readability of its glib text is not so
much a virtue of exposition as it is a trap set for the unwary. It would be unwise, therefore, to
silently put the book aside on the ground that the portions which are novel contain little that
merits notice as a contribution to  reasoned discussions of contemporary science and
technology policy.  The appeal of its text lies elsewhere.  If the recent welcome extended to
the book by The Economist and other, still more glowing reviews in Britain’s Tory press are
thought to carry any reliable signals in such matters,
3 there is more than a little danger of Dr.
Kealey's opus being taken seriously in some influential circles -- indeed, possibly even
beyond the orbits of those politically and ideologically predisposed to be swayed by the
rhythms of a Calypso science policy.
A Case to Answer?
A sad truth about the present state of affairs regarding government funding of science
in the UK, the US, and elsewhere, is that a store of resentments has been built up by past
displays of collective and individual arrogance on the part of "the academic science
establishment."  On too many past occasions its representatives have felt secure in the
public’s approbation of their work, and therefore free to ignore (or deride ) the usefulness of
social scientists, especially those specializing in matters touching the funding and4  Dr. Kealey will be seen (below)  to display these same attitudes, both in his
treatment of economic arguments and in his total neglect of the entire literature on the
sociology of science. 
5  See, e.g., P. Dasgupta and P. A. David, "Toward a new economics of science,"
Research Policy, 23 (1994): pp. 487-521, and other contributions recently surveyed in P. E.
Stephan, "The Economics of Science," Journal of Economic Literature, 34 (September
1996): pp. 1199-1235.  On the central contentions of Dr. Kealey's book, one may consult the
literature survey by B. Martin and A. Salter, et al., The Relationship Between Publicly
Funded Basic Research and Economic Performance -- A SPRU Review (Report Prepared by
Science Policy Research Unit, University of Sussex for H.M. Treasury), July 1996.
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management of research.
4  Whether for that reason or others, the immediate commercial
applicability of basic science has in recent years been much oversold by the science lobby;
and, in the urgency of rallying 'round the troops to combat both skepticism and outright
hostility towards their claims, only woefully inadequate efforts have been made to understand
and present the proper, more subtle economic grounds that do exist for continuing substantial
public patronage of open, academic science. Better understanding on the part of leading
scientific researchers of the analysis and evidence produced by students of the economics and
sociology of science might have opened the door for dispassionate examination of some less
desirable allocative consequences that stem from the workings of the academic science
reward system and peer review;  it could yield useful approaches to reducing the
inefficiencies, and scope for defects in  social accountability, that tend to emerge in systems
of devolved responsibilities and extreme specialization.
5
These were missed opportunities, which had appeared to be scarcely more than
pointless distractions when funding was flush and scientists were widely held in high repute.   
Thus, latterly, in less propitious times, academic scientists occupied with fighting their
respective disciplinary corners, or in speaking on behalf of the larger, collective enterprise
threatened by budget cuts, often erred politically as well as intellectually -- by offering  weak
arguments that left an impression of being considerably more self-serving than persuasive. 
Without the assistance that members of the science establishment  thereby provided, however
unwittingly,  it would have been considerably more difficult for Dr. Kealey to suppose there
was a need, and a receptive audience for a book such as the one he has written.  Yet, clearly,
such an audience exists.  Even within university circles in Britain one can hear voices among
those on the side of the humanities raised to welcome an assault upon the legitimacy of
public funding for research the natural sciences and engineering; even while acknowledging6 See the review of The Economic Laws of Scientific Research by D. Palfreyman, “A
Case to Answer,” in The Oxford Magazine, No. 137, Hilary Term, 1997, pp. 13-14.
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that the case brought might be too extreme, and too ideologically motivated, the point is
urged that it is a salutary thing for the natural science lobby to be given “a case to answer.”
6 
The question remains whether Dr. Kealey’s book has brought the right case to answer. 
The Argument
The point of departure is reasonable enough: Dr. Kealey’s first chapter takes a
skeptical stance in regard to the proposition that public subsidies for scientific and
technological research are automatically conducive to faster economic growth.  Rather than
setting out the possible grounds for such a view, however, he proceeds immediately to
dispute those who appear to take an affirmative position -- without distinguishing among the
variety of views that can be lumped together on that side of the question, some unqualified,
some qualified, some naively simplistic and others more subtle. His opening line of criticism
aims at the most vulnerable target, which is a crude “science supply-push” strategy for
innovation.  The latter is a bastardization of the far more justifiable view that continuing
advances in fundamental scientific knowledge have been secured during the past half-century
through prior “investments” in exploratory research; that these were a major determinant of
the potential for sustained innovations and productivity advances in the industrial economies;
that, further, there is no reason not to expect that, were support for such research to be
continued at equivalent levels in those economies, such would continue to be the case in the
decades ahead.  That should be seen to be quite different from the claim that every
government research grant will yield direct and immediate economic payoffs, or should be
expected to do so.  Unfortunately, the formulaic rationale that government agencies in the
post Cold War era have offered for supporting collaborative industrial R&D projects often is
couched in just such terms, fostering the impression that  tight, highly predictable
connections exist between scientific research performed today and innovations, profits and
jobs that will become available tomorrow.  What is conjured up is  a tidy,  linear sequence
that proceeds from R&D expenditures, to scientific discoveries, to ideas for applying the
latter, to the development of concrete new products and processes, and thence to the
commercial introduction of those innovations, their diffusion into widespread acceptance9
among consumers or industrial users;  readily identifiable productivity improvements,
enhanced international “competitiveness,” and economic welfare gains then are pictured as
flowing automatically from every R&D programme,  as the day follows night.
One of the more useful tasks performed by social scientists who have been writing on 
the economics of science and technology during the past two decades has been to try to
disabuse people of this particular conceptualization of the dynamics of technological
progress,  by continuing to point out the many logical and factual deficiencies in the picture
conjured up by the so-called “linear model.”  Science supply-push doctrine would have us
focus attention and policy action exclusively upon the first link in the sequence envisaged by
the linear model.  Yet, it is not hard to see that this rests on an implicit assignment of
“strategic importance” that is quite arbitrary.   Inasmuch as research activity requires scarce
resource inputs -- whether those invested from the capital and retained earnings of private
firms or expended by the state out of its tax revenues -- the last  stage in the sequence
portrayed by the linear model,  in which more economic output is delivered for the given
direct input of resources used in production, could be just as easily depicted to be temporally
antecedent to the (ensuing) round of research outlays.  In other words, what we are really
dealing with should at very least be conceptualized as a recurring, circular process -- strictly,
a recursive dynamic system.  To cut into the supposed uni-directional flow around this circle
at any arbitrary linkage-point can serve to elevate one, or another of the activities
(fundamental exploratory research, development, commercial innovation, marketing, etc.)
into the star role as “the initiator” of the sequence.  That,  plainly, is  a rhetorical device that
can be, and has been deployed effectively on behalf of the  special interests identified with
the activity thus selected.  But it is not a sound basis for economic policies designed to
increase the pace of technological advance and productivity growth. For economic analysts to
dispose of what may be termed the “vulgar science-push theory of economic prosperity” it
has been quite sufficient simply to re-emphasize a piece of common-sense wisdom: if one is
dependent upon a chain of activities, it will pay to attend to the soundness of all of its links,
especially to the weakest among them, rather than looking only to the one that has been
assigned the initiating position within the sequential arrangement.  For this, and other
compelling reasons, the “simple linear model” has in recent years come to be the favored7 For a now classic critique of the “linear model,” see S. J. Kline and N. Rosenberg,
“An Overview of Innovation,” in R. Landau and N. Rosenberg, eds., The Positive Sum
Strategy: Harnessing Technology for Economic Growth, Washington, D.C.: National
Academy Press, 1986; further discussion appears in P. A. David, “Knowledge, Property and
the System Dynamics of Technological Change,” in L. Summers and S. Shah, Proceedings of
the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics, 1992 (Supplement to The
World Bank Economic Review), Washington, D.C., 1992: pp. 215-248.
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straw-man among economists and others writing on science and technology policy.
7  As is to
be expected, it comes in for a proper thrashing from Dr. Kealey. 
But, instead of discarding the linear model as too simplistic, or reformulating it into a
more complicated dynamic structure with counter-flows and feedback loops of the sort that
have been suggested in the literature, the opening chapter of The Economic Laws of Scientific
Research presages its author’s conclusions by proceeding to stand the whole construct on its
head.  Adam Smith’s authority is invoked to argue that all causal influence flows from the
market, via the inducement of innovation, and thence, via the exploitation of specialization
and division of labor, to invention and the discovery of new scientific principles.  This is not
just an illustration that expectations can make it possible for the direction of influence to flow
backwards, counter to the direction assumed natural in expositions of the linear model.  Dr.
Kealey’s book asserts that historical experience and modern day observation can be used to
demonstrate the unique validity of his upside-down construct, thereby proving that public
sponsorship of basic scientific research is redundant because “advances in science flow from
the technological advances made by industrialists.” (p.8)   The latter has been shown to have
been the case in many instances, but attempting to present it as the singular form of the nexus
between scientific and technological progress does not qualify as an advance in thinking.  It
is nothing but the substitution of a different, equally naive linear model: the ‘free market
demand-pull” theory of economic growth via induced technological progress.  To this  Dr.
Kealey would appended the optimistic faith that if government does not intervene, the
signalling of commercial demands for new technologies by the price system automatically
will inspire and direct the discovery of whatever scientific knowledge business firms might
need to render feasible and profitable the further elaboration and exploitation of those
technologies.  
What, then, is the substance of the argument supporting the faith announced by this
book? Actually, there is remarkably little discussion of what decentralized market systems do11
and how they do it, and a lot about how the State invariably gets it wrong.  According to Dr.
Kealey's simplified version of economics, finance and production are one and the same thing
when undertaken by government; there is no need, therefore, to distinguish between the
consequences of public funding of R&D in universities, and the performance of state
management of scientific research in government laboratories and institutes. Further, since it
is clear to him that government made a shambles of British Rail before it could be rescued by
privatization (p. 247), readers also are expected to accept that government funding of
university-based civilian research (and education) at the taxpayers' expense, similarly, must
be equivalently  inefficient.  Business-funded R&D is always efficiently conducted, he says,
especially when it is carried on in corporate laboratories under conditions of secrecy.  This
logic strikes the Dr. Kealey as so compellingly self-evident as to require no further
substantiation for his conclusion that state patronage of academic science (in the UK, at least)
is just another instance of the foolishness of "nationalizing" activities that would be far better
run by private enterprise.
The real task of his book, therefore, is the marshalling of evidence combed from
economic history and the history of science, along with contemporary quantitative evidence
and economic analysis, in order to establish three more original and radical empirical
propositions that would argue for the remedial “privatizing” of all civilian research.  These
are ultimately codified (in Chapter 10) as the foundational "economic laws" supporting Dr.
Kealey’s Calypso science and technology policy recommendations:
(1) Under capitalism private business incentives to innovate, and the philanthropy
engendered  by the vast  accumulation of private wealth in few hands, increase automatically
with rising per capita real income, bringing increased funding for R&D.  History shows that
this process has provided society with all the scientific and  technology that it requires, save
that which the State might have to procure to fulfill its naturally delimited purposes such as
the maintenance of public order and military defense.  Such  is the burden of the First of the
three "Economic Laws of civil R&D funding" from which the book's title derives.
 (2) Not only is government funding in this sphere unnecessary, it is positively
detrimental, because increased public R&D displaces the other, private sources of funding.
That is the substance of "Kealey's Second Law". 
(3) Indeed, according to the "Third Law," the displacement effect is so strong that
government spending for civilian R&D expenditures (not for military R&D, mind you)12
causes total civilian R&D funding to shrink in relation to the country's aggregate level of
output.  
   Surely it is a notable achievement of some kind to have ploughed through so much
economic history and OECD data, and all those economics journal articles, and yet managed
to emerge with  so erroneous and misleading a collection of generalizations.  How, then, has
Dr. Kealey been able to do it? 
History and the Hunt for "Kealey's First Law"
General conditions of material well-being, and the extent of human technological
mastery and reliable understanding of the natural and artificial environment, may be said to
have advanced together  over the long sweep of history --  surveyed, from the Paleolithic
Period onwards, in the first half of Dr. Kealey's book  This banality, however, amounts to
nothing but the observation of a very broad  temporal correlation.  It cannot be taken to have
held within every society and historical era.  Nor can it be properly adduced as a ground for
regarding the advance of socially useful knowledge to have been the passive partner in the
affair, always responding swiftly and automatically to market incentives and charitable
benefactions -- which the author takes to be the inevitable accompaniments of material
progress.  Yet, the message that greater scientific understanding follows inevitably in the
wake of improved technological practices, rather than preceding and forming a foundation for
them, is  the central motif of the author's selective survey of history of human civilizations up
to the mid-nineteenth century.  One dimension of the selectivity of this curious exercise is its
allocation of one paragraph apiece to the civilizations of China and India, and the omission of
Persia altogether.  The less said here the better in regard to the book’s breezy rendition of the
cultural and technological developments of classical antiquity and the medieval West; for, it
is fairer to acknowledge that the author is more seriously concerned with the lessons for the
present that might be drawn from the subsequent European experience of industrialization
and the beginnings of sustained economic growth.
Misunderstanding the Different Roles of Science in Two Industrial Revolutions
Under that heading, Dr. Kealey quite correctly reports (pp. 60-89) that among British
economic historians there is a long-standing consensus that the Industrial Revolution of the
late eighteenth century was not propelled by any significant investment of the country's13
resources in organized scientific and engineering research, and that the accelerated pace of
technological innovation drew only slightly upon contemporaneous advances in scientific
knowledge. His treatment, however, ignores the existence of long lags in the application and
consequent  economic impacts of advances in scientific knowledge: Chapter 6's discussion of
the Industrial Revolution completely glosses over the point made by a number of  economic
historians' and historians of science that, whereas current science was of limited commercial
relevance, the industrial invention and engineering applications of the second half of the
eighteenth century were grounded firmly upon the prior codification of the principles of
mechanics that had occurred, and had become especially widely diffused in Britain during the
preceding century. 
  For the benefit of those who might doubt that Dr. Kealey’s conclusions about the
eighteenth century apply equally to the dynamics of science, technology and economic
growth  in the twentieth century, the same message is further elaborated by his treatment of
"Economic History since 1870" (Ch. 7). There it assumes the form of two, equally easy
generalizations.  First, the pace of long-run economic development tends to be swifter among
nations who start from comparatively low levels of average income, enabling them to catch
up with  the higher per capita income countries (pp. 96-98).  Second, rising levels of per
capita income will lead to increased funding for R&D, both in absolute and proportional
terms.  Both parts of this argument contain half-truths, but these do not add up to the truth of
the proposition as a whole.  The need to amend his initial statements pertaining to the first
part of the argument is acknowledged, subsequently, when Dr. Kealey (pp. 104-105) says this
only becomes applicable when a poor country has "made the cultural leap into capitalism." 
That isn't entirely true either, but, it suffices here to accept the generalization that among the
OECD countries there has been an historical tendency toward upwards convergence of the
levels of real per capita output (and labor productivity), and that such  convergence has been 
especially pronounced during the second half of the twentieth century.
The element of truth contained in the argument’s second part is that in the modern era
there is some positive correlation between national levels of economic development, and the
proportion of aggregate national income or product that is spent for organized research.  A
broad quantitative association of this sort is implicit in the history of the West surveyed by
Dr. Kealey, and it also may be observed more concretely from contemporary  cross-country
statistical comparisons.  Even within the restricted compass of the OECD statistics, it may be8 In 1985, for example, the low-income countries' gross domestic output (GDP) per
capita,  evaluated in US prices of that year, were still well below the $2,500 mark ($2032 in
Portugal, and $1057 in Turkey, according to the OECD Economic Survey data reported by
Table 10.1 of Dr. Kealey's book, pp. 254-255).  The corresponding estimates for the civilian 
R&D as a fraction of  GDP lay in the range from 0.003 to 0.002.  In  Greece, where the level
of  GDP per capita was closer to the $3300 mark, and thus 50 percent  higher than Portugal's, 
the fraction spent in performing civilian R&D was the same, at  0.003.
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seen that in the low-income countries an almost vanishingly small fraction of the gross
domestic product is devoted to the organized performance of civilian R&D.
8  Moreover, the
economies of  modern day Turkey and Portugal, which in 1985 stood at the bottom-most
rungs of the per capita GDP ladder along which the OECD countries were ranked, were
approximately at the average real income levels attained back in 1870 by the then  richest
nations in the world.   On a rough reckoning for the latter date,  the level of per capita GDP
(evaluated in US prices of 1985) in Britain and the US, respectively, lay close to the upper
and the lower ends of the range from $1500 to $1150.  Viewed from this perspective, the
state of economic (and technological) development that prevailed more universally in the
preceding historical epoch -- the one from which Dr. Kealey would have us draw many
lessons for current economic policy -- is one that at could be said at very best to have
approached that of the world’s poorer nations today.
To be sure, science in those former times was pursued as a comparatively novel and
newly valued cultural activity, one that competed for resources along with religion, literature,
music and the plastic arts.  The small scale of  expenditures upon research inquiries into the
natural and the " made" worlds well might be expected to have grown somewhat faster than
the level of aggregate production and  income, as is generally found to be the case with
"luxuries."  But this tendency would be realized only when and where the average level of
income and its distribution within the society  put sufficient resources into the hands of those
with the tastes and interests to indulge in these diverting, and sometimes useful activities --
whether through private initiatives or under the aegis of State patronage.  
Dr. Kealey's book sketches the general outlines of that historical phase plainly
enough.  What persistently eludes notice in his text is the very different story of science in the
epoch that followed, the very one for which his "laissez-faire science" policies are being
prescribed.  It has been during the era of the Second Industrial Revolution that scientific
analysis and experimental methods were  applied regularly in company-run laboratories,9 Throughout the book the terms "income" and "wealth" are used interchangeably, as
has become fashionable among British economic journalists.  Academic economists will find
it disconcerting, for, they are wont to drill it into the heads of undergraduates that income is a
flow-concept, whereas wealth is a stock-concept, and that much confusion may arise when
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government research institutes, and found a secure place within the elite universities.  There
they began to draw sustained support on a scale that, in the course of  the twentieth century,
has transformed organized R&D into a reliable source of technological innovation, medical
advances, and enhanced productivity -- over the long run.  The relationship between
economic development and the pursuit of scientific research that obtained in Britain, the US
and France in the mid-nineteenth century, and even that which might be thought to obtain
still in the low income countries of the world, is thus a far cry from the complex
interdependencies between investment in scientific research and economic growth that
presently characterizes the situation of the industrially advanced societies.   Moreover, it is
precisely the latter group of countries that are funding and performing most of the world's
R&D. 
Despite this, only one thing seems to strike the author forcibly when he contemplates
the differences between the two epochs -- or, for that matter, when comparing the situation of
Portugal or Turkey with that of Switzerland or the US.  What his book takes to be crucial is
simply the existence very large associated differences between the levels of per capita real
output.  In both contexts the magnitude of the gap in real gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita is huge indeed: for example, by 1985, per capita income (in 1985 US prices) had risen
to about $15,000 in both Switzerland and the US, about 6-7 times the contemporaneous
levels in Turkey and Portugal, and it is striking that the former pair of countries at the time
were spending a correspondingly higher proportion (upwards of 1.7 per cent) of their GDP on
civilian research.
What significance should be read into such correlated contrasts?  According to the
tenets of Calypso science policy, the governments of Turkey and Portugal are not to worry
about their science and technology infrastructures; Kealey's First Law assures that everything
will be attended to automatically, indeed, magically -- because "capitalism" causes economic
growth, so they can expect to catch up with the leaders.  Moreover, providing only that the
politicians do nothing whatsoever, scientists in those countries will get their hands on the
proper share of the resulting "wealth." 
9these two are mixed up. Dr. Kealey, evidently, is writing for an audience untroubled by such
conceptual niceties, and teachers tempted to assign the book to undergraduates should be
wary of this.
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Drawing any causal inferences -- let alone general policy recommendations -- from
cross-country comparisons made across such disparate  circumstances, is likely to be terribly
misleading.  That is so, especially, when the comparisons in question have turned up the
simpler sort of macroeconomic "empirical regularity" that often seems to carry special appeal
for people who have trained in the natural sciences.  Here the case in point is the broad
correlation that Dr. Kealey has taken for "a general law," and described in the following
seductively straightforward way (p.106):  "Rich countries spend a higher percentage of their
GDP on civil R&D than do poor ones."  This wording suggests it is self-evident which of the
two variables is the cause, and which the effect.   Nevertheless, the author lays hold of
some statistical tools in an effort to nail down "Kealey's First Law" --  which would assure us
that higher and higher R&D expenditure will emerge under complete laissez-faire, as an
automatic consequence of rising levels of per capita real income.  He begins with a simple
scatter-diagram (Figure 7.13, p. 107): along the horizontal axis of which (where it is
conventional to locate the supposed causal, or "explanatory" variable), Dr. Kealey has plotted
the 1985 OECD statistics for each of the 21 member countries' respective levels of per capita
GDP (also measured in 1985 US prices); and along vertical axis (the conventional placement
of the "dependent" variable) are plotted the corresponding  national percentage shares of
civilian R&D in GDP.  
[ Place Fig.1 about Here]
The existence of a  positive association  between the two variables is evident, just from the
orientation of the resulting scatter of points -- which  rises upwards and to the right (see Fig.
1, above).  Thus encouraged, Dr. Kealey underscores the positive correlation by showing the
upward-sloping straight line that he has "fitted" to this data (using  the statistical technique of
least-squares regression), and accompanying notes to the Figure reports the bivariate
relationship  to be statistically significant.  
Now, even those who haven't passed an "A-level" course in statistics might get a hint
that something about this is awry.  The ("best-fit") line that has been put through the points in
Fig. 1 (Dr. Kealey's Figure 7.13) plainly predicts a positive R&D share (near 0.25 percentage10 The coefficient of correlation reported by the notes accompanying Figure 7.13 (see
Fig. 1, above) is r =0.7, which implies that the proportion of the sample variance accounted
for is r
2=0.49.
11 As a result, the variation of the actual points above and below those "predicted" by
the regression line that Dr. Kealey has fitted is very much larger, absolutely and
proportionally at the high-income end than it is at the  low-income end. This condition is
described by statisticians as one of "heteroskedasticity," which, in addition to being hard to
pronounce, constitutes a violation of the assumptions of the method of least squares
regression, and signifies that the linear equation estimated by the author contains a serious
specification error.  Were that not enough, the notes accompanying Figure 7.13 contain a
mathematical formula -- supposedly corresponding to the regression line -- that is, on its face
a complete nonsense.  Although harmless for being so self-evidently erroneous to anyone
who would be interested enough to read it, this reporting error seems hard to account for
merely in terms of the vagaries arising from  poor typesetting and inattentive proof-reading. 
Similar reporting errors appear in the book's Figures 7.9, 7.11, 7.12, and  7.14; and
everything that is wrong  with  Figure 7.13, including the mathematical misstatement, also is
wrong with Figure 10.3.
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points) for countries in which the level of income per capita essentially is zero.  Does this
reveal that academic scientists around the world are now so greedy that they will successfully
lobby government for at least some of your very last pennies?  Or should Dr. Kealey's
econometric results be read as showing that some level of research effort must be reached
before it is possible to produce any income at all?  The correct conclusion, of course, is:
"None of the above, thank you."  Readers who are not so  intimidated or otherwise impressed
by this econometric apparatus that they fail to study the scatter-diagram, will be able to see
that the straight line supposedly confirming Dr. Kealey's First Law, actually, does not
describe the 1985 international cross-section data at all well.  For one thing, it "explains" less
than half of the variation present in the data points.
10  Secondly, the thing that is seriously
wrong with the statistical version of "Kealey’s First Law"will become utterly obvious upon 
examining the scatter-diagram a little more closely.  Among the group formed by the 7
OECD countries whose per capita incomes range downwards from $7500, and whose civilian
R&D shares of GDP range downwards from 1.0 percentage points, there is, indeed a very
tight, upward-sloping linear relationship  between the two variables.  Yet,  as soon as one
moves into the portion of the diagram that lies above and to the right of that region -- where
the observations for all the  industrially advanced countries are plotted -- the scatter of points
suddenly balloons outwards.
11 12 Phases of Capitalist Development , Oxford: Oxford University Press (1982).
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Thus, in 1985 Belgium and the Netherlands both spent about 1.5 percent of their GDP
on civilian R&D;  per capita income was around $8500 in the former, whereas it stood close
to $14,000 in the latter country.  In Australia, as in Japan, the level of per capita income at
the time was close to $10,000, yet, Japan spent more that 2.5 percent of its GDP for civilian
R&D, whereas the corresponding share in Australia was little above 1 percent.  The shape
formed by the points in  Figure 7.13 can be visualized most readily as that of a dandelion,
leaning to the right.  Such validity as there is in Dr. Kealey's First Law, therefore,  refers to
what goes on in the stem of this dandelion, and not in its flower.  Moreover, to continue in the
same metaphor, the author's entire extended discussion of the relationship between scientific
research and economic development before and during the First Industrial Revolution,
amounts to searching at the lower-most end of that dandelion's stem to find evidence
supporting the laissez-faire science policy  prescriptions he favors.  Although this reviewer
has never been one to turn scientists of any sort (natural or social) away from the serious
study of historical experience, it would seem considerably more sensible in the present case
to have paid closer attention to the dynamics of the processes that have brought that
dandelion into flower.
   This book's treatment of the evidence of macroeconomic history has thus been 
seriously distorted by the omission of notice of  the body of recent work in which economic
historians have shown "modern, sustained economic growth " to be a  process that has
undergone some striking transformations during the past two hundred years-- in both its
quantitative dimensions and proximate sources.  Sensible historical research intended to
inform contemporary policy decisions cannot approach the study of capitalist growth
dynamics as though it has remained essentially all of one piece; it is a badly  mistaken
optimism that would prescribe for the present and future so simplistically, by pointing to
institutions and policies that appear to have worked well enough for an earlier age.  Yet, that
is just the approach embraced by Dr. Kealey.  The record of long-term economic growth in
Britain since 1700 is presented  (pp. 94-95) as conforming to a pattern which "in capitalist
countries is characteristic."  Looking at Angus Madison's
12 compilation of the estimates of
per capita real output, Dr. Kealey sees Britain's  long eighteenth century  as "a preliminary
period [when] a country emerges from late-feudalism [sic] into capitalism , during which13  The  experience of the UK during what sometimes is referred to as The Second
Thirty Years' War  (1914-1945) pulled its average long-term trend growth rate for the whole
century down,  closer to 1.3 percent per annum. But, in the 1870-1913 and 1950-1973
intervals, the British economy attained the "characteristic" modern growth rates cited in the
text. 
14 For recent estimates of British growth during the Industrial Revolution, see C. K.
Harley, "British Industrial before 1841: Evidence of Slower Growth during the Industrial
Revolution," Journal of Economic History, 42: pp.267-89, (1982); N.F.R. Crafts, British
Growth during the Industrial Revolution, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985; N.F.R. Crafts and
C. K. Harley, "Output Growth and the Industrial Revolution:  a Restatement of the Crafts-
Harley View," Economic History Review, 45: 703-30 (1992).  For estimates of pertaining to
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growth rates slowly accelerate, followed by a sustained period of constant growth rates" -- 
continuing up to the present era. Putting aside Dr. Kealey's possibly inadvertent, but
nonetheless oddly Marxian fantasy  of the English Civil War having been a "late-feudal"
conflict,  we may acknowledge the part of this generalization which is true enough: during
the past 100 years the levels of real output in the leading industrialized nations have been
rising at average growth rates in the neighborhood of 1.6 to 1.9 per cent per year.
13 But, pace
Dr. Kealey, this was not the standard of economic performance achieved during the era of the
Industrial Revolution;  in Britain and the US during the canonical period 1780-1860, the
average pace at which output per capita was rising has been  estimated at less than 1.0 per
cent  per annum.
Why quibble here over a difference of  something considerably smaller than a
percentage point in the growth rates, between the period of the First Industrial Revolution
and the more recent epoch beginning towards the close of the nineteenth century, which has
been dubbed that of the "Second Industrial Revolution"?  Well,  in the case Britain, the
difference between the modern average growth rate of per capita real output of 1.5 percent
per annum and a rate that averaged 0.5 percent per year (during 1770-1841), or 0.9 percent
per year (during 1815-1841), translates into a difference between doubling average living
standards within 46  years, instead of over spans as long as 133 or 77 or years.  Similarly, the
acceleration of the US average annual growth rate from 0.9 over the period 1800-1855 to the
neighborhood of the 1.8 percent per annum rate (maintained from the late nineteenth century
onwards), in effect,  shortened the doubling time of average living standards from 77 year to
38 years -- allowing the latter improvement to be enjoyed twice within the modern expected
life-span.
14growth in the US during 1790-1860, see M. Abramovitz and P. A. David, "Reinterpreting
Economic Growth: Parables and Realities," American Economic Review, 63(2): pp. 428-39
(1973); M. Abramovitz, "The Search for the Sources of Growth: Areas of Ignorance, Old and
New, Journal of Economic History, 53(2): pp. 217-243 (1993);  P. A. David, "Real Income
and Economic Welfare Growth in the Early Republic: A Further Try at Getting the American
Story Straight," Oxford Discussion Papers in Economic and Social History, January (1996).
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A second, even more striking historical transformation involving the growth of
productivity, has been glossed over completely in this part of the book.  The author takes
considerable pains (pp. 85-86, 100-103) to point out that the long-term rise in per capita real
income in the twentieth century has come through increasing labor productivity, and that the
rise of labor productivity has derived mainly from "technical change in the widest sense."
Further, he explains how  economists and economic historians try to gauge the latter, by
measuring the rising productivity of all the productive inputs combined, which they label 
total factor productivity (TFP).  Yet, the general reader who will benefit from this exposition
will be misled by the lack of notice given to the changing quantitative dimensions of the
growth of TFP in the leading industrial countries of the West since the closing decades of the
nineteenth century.  In earlier times, the other principal paths to faster per capita income
growth -- saving more in order to speed up the accumulation of tangible capital goods, and
getting more work out of the population -- had played far bigger roles in the drama of
economic development than they do today in the industrially advanced economies.  Thus, the
most carefully conservative estimates of trends in TFP for the US private domestic economy
show its long-term rate of increase was approximately 1.5 percentage points per year over the
period stretching from the 1889 to 1969.  Inasmuch as that was precisely the era during
which the US became world's industrial leader, that rate  may be taken as indicative of the
pace at which the advancing frontiers of knowledge were being translated into "technical
change in the widest sense."
These economy-wide productivity estimates reflect the dramatic acceleration in the
pace of  technological progress that already was under way as the nineteenth century drew to
a close, and the Second Industrial Revolution began to gather momentum-- signalled
qualitatively by the emergence of a succession of radically new products and industrial
processes based on applications of electricity, organic chemistry, bacteriology, internal
combustion engineering, aerodynamics and avionics, and the use of the electromagnetic
spectrum for (wireless) communications.  Indeed, the rate of growth of TFP in the15 Recent  estimates by economic historians (see references to the work of Crafts and
Harley, and Abramovitz and David, in the previous note) have established the definitive
range from 0.3 to 0.5 percent per annum for the growth of TFP during the period 1780-1860,
in the case of Britain, and 1800-1855 in the case of the US. Most of these findings  have
appeared in the decade-and-a-half following the publication of the undergraduate textbook 
that Dr. Kealey consulted on this issue.  See the reference (p. 87, Table 6.1) to D. N.
McCloskey, "The Industrial Revolution: A Survey," in R. C. Floud and D. N. McCloskey,
eds., The Economic History of Britain since 1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1981).
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technologically leading countries during most of the century following the early 1880s has
been 3 to 5 times faster than the pace of advance achieved in Britain and the US during the
period 1780-1860.
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Undoubtedly, the dominant developments in that profound transformation are the
direct and indirect consequences of the great expansion of public and private "investments"
supporting science and the pursuit of science-based technological knowledge in the West. 
Gathering momentum since the closing decades of the nineteenth century, these have made it
possible for the level per capita real income to double within a span of 60 years -- just
through long-term increases in TFP brought about by advances in technological knowledge
alone.  One can correct the mistaken impressions conveyed in Dr. Kealey's book, by
comparing the latter achievement with that of the era of the Industrial Revolution: then, at the
prevailing slow pace of growth in  TFP ( between 0.3 and 0.5 percent per annum, even when
measured generously),  it would have been necessary to wait, on average, about 200 years for
a doubling of living standards attributable to the advance of technological knowledge alone. 
Gauged in scale of individual human experience, that is approximately the inter-generational
span that would have intervened between the birth of a baby girl and the birth of her great-
granddaughter -- supposing, improbably, that she, and the two intervening girls all would
have been  lucky enough to survive the high mortality rates of the era of the Industrial
Revolution and give birth to a first daughter upon reaching age 25!
 Although  The Economic Laws at other points shows its author’s awareness of the
magnifying power of growth at compound interest, the text’s casual suppression of seemingly
minor quantitative details (such as differences in growth rates) invites casual readers to
ignore the potentially disastrous consequences awaiting  the modern industrial society that
fully embraced the author's viewpoint and implemented his recommendations.  It would have
been difficult, before encountering this book, even to have imagined that anyone would22
seriously advocate a program of economic growth for Britain in the coming century that
applied strict laissez-faire principles in regard to all civilian science and education; harder
still, indeed, to believe that this could be attempted by pointing to the circumstances of
Britain's triumph in the First Industrial Revolution, and assuring skeptical readers (p. 82) that
a public policy prescription good enough for the late-eighteenth century would be found to
serve no less well in attending to the nation's present and future condition.
Why Stop with Misuse of History, When You Can Misuse Economic Historians
Too?
Dr. Kealey's appeal to history is by no means restricted to the quantitative
macroeconomic bits.  He manages also to find ample grist for his mill in the economic history
literature devoted to  the underlying, microeconomic processes.  In too many of these
instances, however, a closer look at the specific studies that are cited will disclose (as the text
does not) that their authors' conclusions are diametrically opposite to the assertions that they
are being used to corroborate.  As these are matters in which the devil dwells in the details,
only two illustrations of this technique in action will have to suffice on the present occasion. 
The first of these arises in connection with Dr. Kealey’s novel  suggestion that the major
long-term benefits of free trade are to be seen not in the statistics of international trade, but,
instead, in the movements of the data on patenting activity.  In support of his contention (p.
128, 212) that  the threat of import competition will "encourage a company to innovate [out
of] the fear that the competition will steal a market with an improved product,"  the author
appreciatively cites a 1988 Journal of Economic History article  by an American economic
historian, Kenneth Sokoloff. The reader is told that this is a fascinating study that has
exploded "the protectionist  myth" and "demonstrated empirically [that] imports (even
subsidized imports) stimulate domestic invention," by showing that in the U.S. during the
early nineteenth century the number of patent filings per capita increased in counties that
were reached by a navigable river or canal.  
All but the very last bit of this will be news to Professor Sokoloff, who, if we are to
believe Dr. Kealey, has utterly missed the significance of his own research.  Presumably, it
was the opportunity to correct that “oversight” that encouraged Dr. Kealey to ignore the
extensive arguments and collateral evidence that the paper’s author had marshalled to support
quite another set of  propositions about the effect of trade on inventive activity.  Professor16  This protection was a consequence of Jefferson's  Embargo Act of 1807, and the
ensuing legislative measures restricting trans-Atlantic commerce, culminating in the further
disruption of trade with Britain during the War of 1812.  The era of  deliberately protectionist
tariff legislation in the U.S. commenced later, with the Tariff of 1824, but the movements in
the patenting statistics thereafter do not conform with the collapse of inventive activity that
Dr. Kealey's theory would seem to predict.
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Sokoloff's article  says that it was the prospective access to wider (export) markets, and to
bulky, raw materials -- both of which were opened by cheap waterborne transportation -- that 
induced manufacturers to locate production in those inland counties, and thus drew footloose 
inventors to congregate in close proximity to the enterprises that might make use of their
patentable ideas.  The issue in this is not the validity of Dr. Kealey's notions about the effects
of free trade in commodities upon business investments in R&D, but, his cavalierly 
misleading invocation of Professor Sokoloff's "authority" in support of those speculations. 
The abuse in this is all the more “patent,” one might say,  because the main thrust of the cited
article was to show the role of expected demand in stimulating inventive activity.  Indeed, so
far was the thesis argued by Professor Sokoloff from Dr. Kealey's free reinterpretation, that
his journal article explicitly identified the major factor responsible for stimulating the sharp
rise in the level of US patenting activity after 1815 as none other than the protection of
American manufacturers from the competition of British imports during the preceding
period!
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A second illustrative example of Dr. Kealey's misuse of the work of quantitative
economic and social historians appears at the very end of this book, where readers are offered
a "Postscript on Education and the Free Market" (pp. 347-353).  This displays the author’s
complete mastery of a variation on the basic technique -- plucking out a particular historical
nugget to produce  as evidence for a view that blatantly ignores other facts and conclusions
reached in the source from whence it has been drawn. "The history of education," writes Dr.
Kealey,
"parallels to a remarkable degree the history of science funding, and that
history disproves the suggestion that government need be involved.  One of
the first countries to boast a fully literate population was Britain, which by
1891 enjoyed 100 per cent literacy amongst its school-leavers....Yet, up to
1891, education in Britain was largely laissez faire." (p. 347). 17 That  impression is soon reinforced by the author's flat rebuttal of the statements
made by Corelli Barnet, in The Audit of War (1986), that "In the 1860s there were still fewer
children in grant-aided elementary schools of efficient standard than there were children
receiving no form of education whatsoever."  Such statements, says Dr. Kealey, "are deeply
misleading, and they flow from an appalling deception of the House of Commons" practiced
by advocates of "the monstrous Elementary Education Bill" introduced  in 1870.(p.251)
18 See, Explorations in Economic History, 10 (4),1973: pp. 437-454.  In Dr. Kealey’s
citation, however, the dates have been omitted.
19 See Schofield (1973: p. 442). The chart shows that illiteracy lay in the 1-2 percent
range for the men and women who arrived at the altar in 1905-06, so it may be surmised that
this reflected their illiteracy rate on leaving school  15 years earlier.  Dr. Kealey says it was
nil, but, in this case, there is no point to quibbling over a difference of percentage point or
two. 
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A bit further on, the text remarks that "church and private-school attendance reached 99
percent" during the 1860s, a condition that is said to have permitted the passage through the
House of Lords of the Education Act of 1870 -- because the bishops sitting there no longer
felt any need "to block state competition with the church schools."(p.349).  An otherwise
uninformed  reader would have to be forgiven for surmising from this that the introduction of
state-schooling in Britain had been an entirely redundant gesture.
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Now, immediately following his statement about the illiteracy rate among Britain's
school-leavers in 1891, Dr. Kealey has supplied a supporting scholarly reference to an article
by the Cambridge historical demographer Roger Schofield: "The Dimensions of Illiteracy,
1750-1850."
18  Although Dr. Schofield's study was focused on a somewhat earlier period in
the history of illiteracy, it does contain a chart displaying the annual statistics compiled by
the Registrar General of England and Wales for the percentage of males and females unable
to sign their name at the time of marriage.  From that information (and Dr. Schofield's
estimate that in this period the mean interval between school-leaving and entry into marriage
was approximately 15 years), one may confirm the rough accuracy of rounding down to zero
a 1-2 percent illiteracy rate for the cohorts who left school c.1891.
19  But, something more
can be inferred from the same chart, about which Dr. Kealey's text remains mute.  Only a few
decades earlier, which is to say, prior to the Education Act of 1870, the situation prevailing
among English and Welsh children of school-leaving age had been very different: fifteen
years after 1860 the proportions of brides and bridegrooms unable to sign their name to the
wedding register had stood at 17 and 23 percent, respectively; and, proceeding on the same20   Consider: among the boys and girls who had left school some thirty years earlier
in the century (i.e., c.1840) rates of illiteracy in England and Wales had ranged as high as 30
percent and 40 per cent, respectively.  Statistics of the same kind for Scotland show that at
this time the rates of illiteracy among cohorts of school-leaving age were as low as 11 per
cent and 23 percent, respectively.  See, e.g., C. M. Cipolla, Literacy and Development in the
West, Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books (1969): pp. 121-124.  One can only
wonder how Dr. Kealey would propose to explain such different outcomes from these two
educational regimes, inasmuch as the distinctions between them are obscured by his
categorization of "education in Britain" as having been "largely laissez faire."
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basis one can see that at the end of that decade, on the eve of the Education Act, illiteracy
rates among those of school-leaving age in England and Wales still must have been running
at close to 12-13 percent.  That figure, of course, must greatly understate the degree of
illiteracy among the working age population at the time.
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From the Education Act of 1870 onwards, however, government provision of
schooling drove illiteracy precipitously downwards, while raising the general standards of
schooling (attendance, length of school year, scope of the curriculum, qualifications of
teachers). More than one economic and social historian of Britain has argued that this new
departure had come not a moment too soon., and Dr. Schofield might well be counted among
them.  The very article that Dr. Kealey has cited concludes with the observation that by the
time state schooling was initiated, Britain already had passed beyond the era (1750-1850) in
which the decline of illiteracy could be considered "more as a cultural change brought about
by economic growth"; economy and society in Britain were entering the present epoch, in
which the direction of former causal relationships were reversed;  the furtherance of universal
education was emerging (in parallel with intangible investments in organized scientific
research) as a new and increasingly potent force for the continuation of modern economic
growth.  There is indeed a striking parallelism to be read in the histories of public support for
science and for education, but, in Dr. Kealey's book the similarities in timing and significance
are achieved by a parallel distortion of both stories.
   
"Kealey's Second, and Third Law"
  It is understandable, perhaps, that after delving so uncritically into the economic and
social history of eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain, one might come away (as Dr.
Kealey has done from his researches for Chapters 2-7), quite unable to perceive any vital role21Students of US economic history, however, will have some trouble with Dr.
Kealey’s misapprehensions concerning the role of government in the economic development
of that nation.  For one thing, the only “government” he can see is federal, which leaves the
significant impact of state and municipal governments -- in areas ranging from education to
transportation -- entirely out of his picture.
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for growth-oriented programmes involving major commitments of government funding in the
spheres of science and education.
21  Something further, however, has made it possible to
sustain that conviction when studying the world we have gained, rather than the worlds left
behind.  This further ingredient is the consistent disregard which Dr. Kealey displays for the
use of "controls" when seeking to extract conclusions from statistical data, as well as a
proclivity to misconstrue the import of theoretical analyses that turn on quantitative
propositions.  The core of this performance (in Chapters 9 and 10) truly is most remarkable --
especially so from an author professionally trained in the methods of the natural and life
sciences.  His production and application the Second and Third Laws, in particular, relies
upon the a special gift (intimated in Chapter 7) for demonstrating almost all the ways in
which the statistical method of bivariate regression analysis can be misused, misinterpreted,
and misreported (pp. 107-108, 241-243).
To learn whether or not the funding of public and private R&D behaved as substitutes
(the growth of one displacing the other), one would have thought that a quite straightforward
approach would be to examine those variables' joint movements -- while holding constant
("controlling")  as many other background conditions as was feasible.  A very simple way to
do this is to look at a number of national economies that perform substantial amounts of
R&D and see if it is true that within some given time interval those countries in which
government funding of civilian R&D increased faster, also were the ones in which privately
funded R&D was growing more slowly.  If there was a "super-displacement" of private R&D
by government civilian R&D, in conformity with the so-called Third Law, it would be seen
that growth rates of total civilian R&D spending (adjusted for price changes) were higher in
those economies where the public funding had increased most slowly.  Dr. Kealey apparently
omitted to try a test of this sort.
Instead, he has arrayed international cross-section data for the OECD countries in
1985 in the following graphical way (Figure 10.1, p. 241): the percentage of its gross
domestic product (GDP)spent on civilian R&D each nation is plotted along the vertical axis27
of the graph, and along the horizontal he plots the country's ratio of business R&D spending
to its governmental funding of civilian R&D.  Some positive association appears in the
resulting scatter-diagram (see Fig. 2).  For example,  in two nations, (Japan and Switzerland)
civilian R&D's share in GDP is very high, over 2.5 percentage points, and the contribution
made by the business R&D component is 3.5 to 4 times as large as that coming from the
public sector; at the other extreme, there are countries (such as Turkey and Portugal) where
civilian R&D expenditures amount to only a bit more than 0.25 percent of GDP, and the
business component is only approximately half that provided by the government. In some 15
other countries, this pair variables take on values intermediate between the extremes just
described. 
[Place Fig.2 about Here]
On this occasion, the text (p. 241) pauses properly to acknowledge  that the mere
presence of a statistically significant positive correlation in this set of cross-section
observations is not quite sufficient to prove the claims of "Kealey's Second and Third Laws;"
something further is need to be able to say that  where the ratio of government to business
funding is high (e.g., Turkey and Portugal), this is causing  total civilian R&D funding to
remain very small in proportion to GDP.  Why isn't the opposite interpretation the more
plausible? Even a low level of governmental R&D expenditures could appear relatively large
in these low-income economies, and might be undertaken because private R&D investment 
there had remained so small.  Indeed, when one looks carefully at the points plotted in this
graph, it is evident that they do not even suggest that the these two variables are causally
linked by some simple, linear relationship.  For example, the R&D share in GDP in Sweden
and Germany is essentially the same as that observed in Switzerland and Japan, whereas the
ratios of business to government funding in the former pair are much lower, around 2; on the
other hand, among the 9 countries whose private and public sources of R&D funding are
approximately in balance (the business-government funding ratio varying only narrowly
between 0.75 and 1.25),  the shares of total civilian R&D in GDP range as widely as from 0.5
percentages points to approximately 2.1 percentage points.  Anything so simple as the
hypothesis of a linear dependence of the share on the ratio appears to be an erroneous22 Readers also would have been spared a further piece of bad econometrics (pp. 242-
243 and Figure 10.2).  There the an attempt is made to show that it is the cross-country
variations of the business-government funding ratio that are causing the statistical forecast
errors which arise when using Kealey's First Law to "predict" the cross-section share of total
civilian R&D simply from the corresponding 1985 level of per capita GDP.  These "errors,"
which should be normally distributed around the regression line, are measured as the vertical
distance between the actual observations and the corresponding points on the (mis-specified)
regression line in Dr. Kealey's Figure 7.13 (see Fig.1, above).  Unfortunately, the statistical
procedure that Dr. Kealey follows in this exercise contains another classic flaw: in effect, it
"controls" for the influence of per capita income variations only upon the (supposed)
dependent variable, the civilian R&D share, but omits to control also for that variable's
"effect" upon the business-government R&D funding ratios in the OECD cross-section data. 
As one might suspect, however, there is positive covariation between the latter pair of
variables; science-based manufacturing industries and, hence, company-financed R&D tends
to be relatively less important among countries that fall at the lower end of the per capita
income range.  No very sophisticated statistical methods would have been needed for Dr.
Kealey to have confirmed this, even from the data that appear in his Figures 7.13 and 10.1
(reproduced here as Figs. 1 and 2). Consider, simply, that among the 7 countries ranking
highest in terms of the business-government funding ratio, their average rank in the 1985
distribution of per capita incomes was 7, and the median among this group position was held
by Sweden, which stood 5th in per capita income among all the countries in the OECD
sample.  At the opposite pole, among the 7 countries for which the business-government ratio
was lowest (excluding Turkey, for which this data is not available), the average of country
rankings in by per capita income was 14; the median position among the bottom 7 was held
by New Zealand, which came 16th in the per capita income distribution.
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specification (again) of the structural relationships that underlie the international cross-
section observations. 
Nevertheless, Dr. Kealey pronounces the upward-sloping straight line ("fitted" by the
method of least-squares regression) in Figure 10.1, to be a satisfactory representation of the
data, and then sets forth a theoretical case for interpreting it to reflect the hypothesized
"super-displacement" effects of government R&D funding.  Had the statistical methodology
of multiple regression analysis been used as a way to control for the concurrent  influences of
other differences among these countries,  such as their differences with respect to levels of
real GDP per capita, readers might have been spared at least the ensuing passages of
ingeniously misleading argumentation. (pp. 242-250).
22  Indeed, had Dr. Kealey but
performed the simplest "test" that is proposed above, and looked at the OECD statistics for
just the G-7 countries (those responsible for most of the capitalist world's R&D) in the period
1981-1993, the dubious character of the so-called Second and Third Laws would have been
exposed plainly.  Within this sample of high per capita income countries, the cross-country23  The following figures are based on the data in European Commission, The
European Report on Science & Technology Indicators, 1994 (Report EUR 15874 EN),
Luxembourg, 1994: Table 1.3; 1.7A.
24There are a number of very good reasons why this should be the case, as will be
noted a bit further on.
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variations in the proportionate growth rate of total civilian R&D turn out to be associated
positively with the proportionate growth of government funding for non-military research.  
In actuality,  Britain turned out to be singular among the major industrial powers in the West
in sustaining a decline in the ratio of real aggregate R&D expenditures to real Gross
Domestic Product during the decade of the 1980s.
23 Whereas that ratio rose in Germany from
2.4 percent to 2.8 percent, in France from 2.0 percent to 2.4 percent, in the whole of the EU
excluding the UK from 1.6 percent to 1.9 percent, in Britain it slid from 2.3 to 2.1 percent.  In
Japan the ratio surged upwards from 2.3 percent to 2.8 percent, whereas in the U.S. the share
of total R&D was held steady (at 2.6 percent) by heavy military R&D in connection with
President’s Reagan’s “Star Wars” program, raising worries about the relative “crowding
out”of industrially more relevant civilian R&D.  What happened in the UK was more
dramatic, because the real level of government funding for civilian R&D was cut in absolute
terms, by about 20 percent over the period 1981-1993, and a relatively slow expansion of
R&D expenditures from all other (private) sources turned out to be inadequate to prevent
total civilian R&D from growing at more than the comparatively sluggish pace of 1.5 percent
per year.  The latter thus fell far below the 3.2 percent per annum rate maintained by
Germany and the US during this period -- they being the next most sluggish members of the
G-7 pack in this regard.  One should view the behavior of the public and private components
of civilian R&D as complements and not substitutes.
24 This certainly offers no support at all
for the contention that government support for research over-displaces private R&D
investment.
Yet, Dr. Kealey proceeds to claim the experience of Britain during the 1980s as a
"beautiful demonstration" of his dubious  Third Law.  Pointing out that increased funding of
university research from industry and the medical charities softened the blow dealt by
government cutbacks (pp. 285-286), he takes that as sufficient grounds upon which to
dismiss (as "simplistic" and lacking any proper empirical substantiation) the concerns
expressed over the reduction of government R&D funding at the time, notably by Ben Martin25 Some part of the latter contraction is probably attributable to the impact of the
recession in 1991/92 - 1992/93, but there was no rise in industry funding for university
research when the government cuts were sustained. The underlying data is discussed in A.
Geuna, “Allocation of Funds and Research Output: The Case of UK Universities,” MERIT
Research Memorandum (Maastricht), January 1997, forthcoming in Revue d’Economie
Industrielle, 1997. 
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and John Irvine, of  the University of Sussex’s Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU).   With
specific regard to the support of university research, the reality of events in Britain simply
does not correspond to the impression conveyed by Dr. Kealey’s insistence (pp.283-286) that
university science was not adversely affected by government cuts during this period, because
“stagnation in government grants to the University Grants Committee (UGC) and academic
science prompted a resurgence of private funding.” There are two points at issue here, one
concerning what happened to the aggregate level of university research funding, and the other
having to do with the underlying causes and the consequent alternations in the allocation of
support among fields.  During the 1980s the great expansion of university research funding
from the medical charities was an essentially fortuitous offsetting factor, and there is no basis
for Dr. Kealey’s suggestion that  the rise in private sector support for academic research was
an induced response, supposedly from  industry relieved of the burdens of government
taxation.  Available statistics from the Higher Education  Statistical Office show that
government finance for research via Exchequer grants and Research Council awards to the
“old universities” (excluding the former polytechnics and colleges) dropped by 23 percent in
real terms over the period 1989/90 to 1992/93. Instead of finance from industry coming to the
rescue, the real value of research funds received by these universities from that source
contracted by 5.3 percent during the same interval.
25   So much for the empirical foundations
of Dr. Kealey’s recommendations on the funding of science and technology research.
Were the “over-displacement effect” hypothesis advanced by Dr. Kealey  empirically
valid as a macroeconomic proposition, one still would have to consider carefully the
implications for the composition of research activity of his contention that withdrawal of
government support for academic science would have a net stimulating impact. The cuts in
government funding over the course of the 1980s and the rise in both the absolute and
relative importance of the dependence upon British science for private funds from the
medical charities and industry, have had a perceptible impact on the rate and direction of
scientific publication activity in the country.  But these effects  are ignored by  Dr. Kealey. 31
Instead of examining what did happen following the public sector cutbacks in the early
1980s, his discussion of the issue   (pp. 276-280), is devoted to finding fault with the
arguments produced by those who warned about the likely effects.  In this he makes the valid
point that opponents of Mrs. Thatcher’s policy who presented Britain’s shrinking share of the
world’s scientific publications during the 1970s as a harbinger of “scientific decline” had
overlooked the fact that those statistics were reflecting an upsurge of English language
publications in the sciences emanating from Japan and other rising industrial economies.  It is
equally correct, if somewhat besides the point, for Dr. Kealey to fault the critics for failing to
emphasize that in 1982 Britain’s scientific productivity, gauged by the absolute level of its
scientific publications was still robust, and that by this measure British scientists collectively
stood second only to the US in each of  the major fields of science and engineering.
 Of course, it is merely setting up a straw man to construe the talk of an impending
“decline of British” science literally, as a prediction of the imminent collapse in the absolute
number of scientific publications by the country’s research community.  What was of concern
at the time was the prospective alteration in the position of British scientific activities vis-a-
vis those being conducted by researchers in the other, industrially mature economies.  Were
those concerns utterly foolish, as Dr. Kealey still insists?  Far from it.  Although his text
remains strangely silent about the trends in Britain’s comparative scientific publications rates
that emerged over the period 1981-1993,  these  might well be thought to have amply borne
out the worries voiced by leading scientists and science policy analysts when the policy of
the Conservative government began to take shape. Between 1981/1983 and 1991 Britain’s
volume of scientific papers declined markedly in comparison with the rest of the European
Union, as well in comparison with the world at large.  More significantly, the fall in Britain’s
share of European scientific papers occurred across the board,  in every major area of the
natural and life sciences, mathematics and engineering.  This was the case even in clinical
medicine, a field that have been a particular beneficiary of the rise in funding from the
pharmaceutical industry as well as from the medical charities, and the sole research area in
which Britain maintained  its initially high share of the world’s scientific output. Thus, by the
beginning of the 1990's,  in more than half of the major scientific fields Britain no long held26  Based on calculations from underlying data from Science Citation Index, in
European Commission, European Report on Science & Technology Indicators, 1994, Tables
1.11A through 1.11I. The average contraction in the British share of EU papers was 4.1
percentage points in the “weak decline fields” (clinical medicine, biomedicine, chemistry and
physics), whereas in the “strong decline” fields ( biology, earth sciences and space,
engineering, and mathematics) the average share dropped by 9.25 percentage points.
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its former position as runner-up to the U.S. in the volume of scientific publications.
26  These
shifts, and what they might portend for the future scientific base of knowledge and domestic
scientific know-how for sectors of the British economy other than those directly involved in
health services and veterinary medicine, would seem to justify further careful examination,
rather than silence, and the continuing derisory dismissal in this book of those who have
worried that, below the continuing growth of the aggregate mass of the nation’s scientific
publications, all might not be well with the state of the scientific enterprise in Britain. 
Dr. Kealey and the Conquest of Economic Theory
 
The foundations for the author's thesis that have been provided at the level of
microeconomic analysis turn out to be even less substantial -- if that really is possible.  Dr.
Kealey’s book has confronted the economics of R&D head on, and has defeated it. 
Economists have worked out cogent reasons why the price system and competitive markets
should not be expected to do a good job  producing, or distributing knowledge and
information -- certainly not by comparison with their performance in similarly allocating
resources in the case of more conventional, tangible commodities such as fish or chips (of
both the computer and the potato varieties). This conclusion rest upon the fundamental
insight that ideas -- especially ideas tested and reduced to codified scientific and
technological information -- have some important attributes found in "public goods," and the
thoroughly studied problems that would arise were one to rely upon the competitive market
mechanism to provide for pure public goods, such as a smog-free environment, or defense
against nuclear missile attack.   Rather than systematically examining the factual premises
and logic of this line of analysis, the author simply waves away the conclusions, explaining
(in a footnote aside) that economists try to reveal "the market's imperfections" in order "to
further their own professional importance." (p. 215) 27 The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson, eds., A. Koch and W. Peden. 
New York: The Modern Library (1972): p.629.  The excerpt quoted in the text appears in a
letter written to a Baltimore inventor in 1814. The entire passage has been reproduced and
discussed in P. A. David, "Knowledge, Property, and the System Dynamics of Technological
Change," in Proceedings of the World Bank Annual Conference on Development Economics,
1992, eds., L. Summers and S. Shah, Washington, D.C.: World Bank Press, 1993: pp. 215-
248.
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Acknowledging the peculiar character of information as an economic commodity is
central to the modern economic analysis of R&D.  An idea is a thing of remarkable
expansibility, being capable of spreading rapidly from mind to mind without lessening its
meaning and significance for those into whose possession it comes.  In that quality, ideas are
more akin to fire than to coal.  Jefferson remarked upon this attribute, which permits the same
knowledge to be jointly used by many individuals at once: "He who receives an idea from
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine
receives light without darkening me...." 
27  Economists, therefore, have pointed out that the
potential value of an idea to any individual buyer generally would not match its value to the
social multitude. The latter, however, is not readily expressed in a willingness to pay on the
part of all who would gain from the illuminating idea; once a new bit of knowledge is
revealed by its discoverer(s), some benefits instantly will "spill over" to others who are
therefore able to share in its possession.  How, then, could ideas be traded in markets the kind
envisaged by disciples of Adam Smith -- except by having aspects of their nature and
significance disclosed before the transactions were consummated?  Rational buyers of ideas,
no less than of coal, and fish and chips,  first would want to know something about what it is
that they will be getting for their money.  Even if the deal fell through, it is to be expected
that the potential purchaser would enjoy (without paying) some benefits from what 
economists refer to as "transactional spill-overs." These occur because there may be
significant commercial advantages from the acquisition of even rather  general information
about the nature of a discovery, or an invention -- especially one that a reputable seller has
thought it worthwhile to bring to the attention of people engaged in a particular line of
business. This leads to the conclusion that the findings of scientific research, being new
knowledge, would be seriously undervalued were they sold directly through perfectly
competitive markets; some degree of exclusivity of possession of the economic benefits
derived from ideas is necessary, therefore, if the creators of new knowledge are to derive any28 Governmental support for the collaborative development of reference standards, or
direct funding of agencies that undertake such work, such as national standards institutes,
constitutes a mechanism for rectifying the effects of this particular form of competitive
market failure. The alternative of granting monopoly privileges (under intellectual property
rights provisions) to the private developer of a standard has a perverse effect in this particular
case: in tending to restrict the extent of the standard’s use, it would deprive even those who
did pay the monopolist’s charges from enjoying the fuller benefits of an enlarged user
community. This is a general problem with standards for systems in which there are what
economists refer to as  “network externalities” -- such as the telephone system, whose value
to individual subscribers is enhanced by being able to call, and be called by a larger number
of subscribers. 
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profit from their activities  under a capitalist market system. Intellectual property rights, in
the form of patent and copyright monopolies serve this end. But, imposing restrictions on the
uses to which ideas may be put also saddles society with the inefficiencies that arise when
monopolies are tolerated, a point harped upon by  economists ever since Adam Smith.  
  As quite general considerations of the foregoing sort are not presented in this book,
it will not come as a surprise to find that the author has also omitted to notice the failure of
competitive  markets to rise to the special challenges posed by a special category of
knowledge products sometimes described as “technical standards.” These acquire economic
value for their possessors only as a consequence of being publicly disclosed and jointly
utilized, and actually grow in utility for the individual user in proportion to the degree of
universality in their adoption.  Many technological and engineering “reference standards,”
such as those for the thread-sizes of nuts and bolts, or the diameter of optical fibre (to permit
splicing without degrading the light signal that is propagated through the inner core),  benefit
buyers and vendors by reducing transactions costs and permitting economies of scale in
production, especially when they are widely adopted.  Firms that know of, and wish to use
such standards would have every incentive to freely share that information, in order to
encourage others to follow suit. Nevertheless, an adequate supply of reference standards and
kindred “infratechnologies” may not be forthcoming through individual private enterprise, as
it may not be worthwhile for any single firm to undertake the cost of designing a reference
standard that would be most useful for the industry as a whole.
28 35
A Scientist in Praise of Secrecy? 36
In addition to impugning the motives of those who reason in such terms, Dr. Kealey
pronounces their entire line of analysis to be devoid of any practical economic relevance.  In
the course of a deeply confused critique of a technically difficult article by the economist
Paul Romer (pp. 230-32), the author comes up with what he believes to be the crushing
rejoinder to those who think that new scientific information tends to be undervalued by
competitive markets.  A given technological  idea, he rather triumphantly points out "cannot
be 'used in as many different activities as desired'  without the intervention of people" (p.
231);  like any other human cognitive ability it has no meaning or utility outside a human
head. So, new ideas residing in the heads of scientists and inventors, manifestly, cannot be
"public goods" because those people do not possess the characteristics of public goods.
Of course this completely misses the point that the same idea may be socially useful
in many heads, even those which did not first conceive of it.  Instead, it emphasizes a favorite
theme of Dr. Kealey's -- the value of exclusive possession of technological information: 
researchers surely are able to prevent others from gaining access to their services, and a
person can only do one thing at a time, so,  if one firm is employing them at any moment of
time, other firms cannot so do.  "Good industrial research,"according to Dr. Kealey, is 
conducted under conditions of "confidentiality" and "seclusion" (pp. 250-51).  Thus, one may
supposedly rely upon market forces to make the whole problem go away: universal industrial
secrecy is sufficient to rule out the difficulties that otherwise might be caused by some firms
"free-riding" on the R&D investments of others, and to render irrelevant any worries that
incomplete private appropriation of the benefits of research would dilute the private business
incentives to push R&D as far, and in as many directions as would be socially desirable. 
Q.E.D.!    
At this point in his theoretical exposition, quantitative empirical issues no longer
engage Dr. Kealey’s attention.  He does not pause to consider what costs a strategy of secrecy
imposes upon private enterprise; whether such practices can be totally effective in the face of
the mobility of technical personnel and reverse engineering; what potential would be created
for even greater collective wastage of R&D resources (not to mention injury to consumers), 
were the developers of new products and processes actually able to maintain indefinite29 One might think of the tobacco companies’ research on the carcinogenic properties
of coal tar, and the addictive effects of nicotine, but, there are more benign social costs in
keeping knowledge secret.  E. T. Bell (Men of Mathematics, New York: Simon and Schuster,
1937: pp. 228-230), concluded that for all that Gauss had achieved by the time of his death in
1853, the progress of nineteenth century mathematics was held back by as much as 50 years
due to Gauss’s commitment of much more to his secret, private notebook. In this scientific
diary (not examined until 1898), Gauss indulged his penchant for suppressing key pieces of
the apparatus that he had developed on the path to his results, so that even after it existence
became known, some time elapsed before mathematicians were able to grasp its full import.  
30In itself this is quite surprising, given the author's claims (printed on the book's back
cover) to have first-hand expertise in research supported by Glaxo, Roche and other major
companies -- in the pharmaceutical industry -- where patents really do matter!
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secrecy about their research results.
29  So sure is Dr. Kealey of the benefits of industrial
secrecy, that his book nowhere discusses the economic logic of extending the protection of
the State to intellectual property in science and technology.
30  Modern economic analysis has
come to view the granting of patent and copyright monopolies as a sacrifice of the short-run
interests of consumers that may be justified by the far greater gains that are expected to result
over the long run -- from giving creators of new, useful knowledge more secure pecuniary
incentives to reveal it rapidly to the public at large.  Either this understanding is alien to Dr.
Kealey, or he does not like it.  The only economic function of patents acknowledged in his
book is that of generating income which the patentor might use to fund further research. (pp.
136-37)
Amazingly, Dr. Kealey also seems not to have grasped the still more central point that
the progress of scientific and technological knowledge is a cumulative process, one that
depends in the long-run on the disclosure of new findings, so that they may be speedily
discarded if unreliable, or confirmed and brought into fruitful conjunction with other bodies
of reliable knowledge.  In this way open science promotes the rapid generation of further
discoveries and inventions, as well as wider practical exploitation of additions to the stock of
knowledge.  The economic case for public funding of basic research rests on that insight; and
upon the observation that business firms are bound to be put off in some considerable
measure by the greater uncertainties surrounding investment that entails entering into
fundamental, exploratory inquiries (compared to commercially targeted R&D), as well as by
the difficulties of forecasting when and how such outlays will generate a satisfactory rate of
return.  In reply to this, Dr. Kealey offers only the following reductio ad absurdum: If31 It should be noted that corporate directors are likely to be less patient in evaluating
the expected future returns than is society as a whole, in the sense of being more prone to
discount the economic benefits that would be received in the future, indeed, even by future
generations.
32Just conceivably (the text, however, does not say as much), the author might have
had  in mind the possibility of a spontaneous emergence of one of those happy situations, in
which businessmen hire curiosity-driven research scientists in a mis-guided effort to uncover
the basis of each others' innovations, not realizing that those rival firms' secrets have been
well and truly hidden.  Hey presto, out pops the magical result that  everyone ends up
satisfied to have learned about the new, fundamental discoveries that occurred in  everybody
else’s basic research laboratories, as by-products of their fruitless efforts to probe for
information about their business rivals' applied R&D results!  (In economists' jargon this
could be described as a "Calypso-Nash Equilibrium".)  Wonderful things like that can
happen. Yet, much more powerful magic would be needed to show how such an equilibrium
outcome could emerge automatically from a  very different state of affairs, and be sustained
when the firms noticed that they were not actually uncovering their rivals' secrets.  Moreover,
the important point to emphasize here is that there is absolutely nothing in the workings of a
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economists the likes of Kenneth Arrow and Richard Nelson were correct in advancing this
now-classic argument (over thirty years ago), profit-seeking companies today would not
undertake any R&D of the basic, exploratory sort.  But, as some firms do spend money
performing basic research, the economists’ argument is palpably false. (p. 225)  That rebuttal
just won’t do. The proposition at issue here is quantitative, not qualitative; one cannot
adequately answer the question “Will there be enough?” merely by saying “There will be
some.”  Economists do not claim that without public patronage (or intellectual property
protection), basic research would cease entirely. Rather, their analysis holds that there will
not be enough basic research -- not as much as would be carried out were individual
businesses (like society as a whole) able to anticipate capturing all the benefits of this form of
investment.
31
Several recent economic studies point out that R&D-intensive companies fund some
basic research in order to monitor progress at the frontiers of science, to pick up ideas there
for potential lines of innovation that may be emerging from the research of others, and also to
better penetrate the secrets of their rivals' technological practices.  This is the situation as it
now exists.  In calling it to his readers’ attention, Dr. Kealey does not stop to ask what will
happen in the brave new world that he advocates, where all the business firms really were
keeping their R&D results completely secret, and governments stopped all funding of open,
academic science?
32competitive market that assures that this particular conjectured equilibrium -- a fragile
coincidence of mutually supporting actions premised upon unfulfilled expectations -- would
generate the right kinds, and amounts of basic research funding needed to address the
opportunities and challenges facing modern society. 
33See his Einstein, History, and Other Passions: The Rebellion Against Science and
the End of the Twentieth Century, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing , 1996.
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Missing the Complementarity between Exploratory and Applications-Driven
Research
The gravest deficiency of this book's treatment of the economic analysis of scientific
research stems from the author's obsessive attention to the competition for R&D funding that
pits applied commercially oriented projects against academic, open science research -- a
failing forgivable enough in a research scientist living through these times, but less so in one
who claims to understand the interrelationship among the various components of the national
science and technological innovation system.  Resources are limited, to be sure, and in that
sense research conducted in one field, and in  one organizational mode is being performed at
the expense of other kinds of R&D. But what is missed by attending exclusively to the
competition forced by budget constraints, is an appreciation of the ways in which basic
science and academic research activities  support commercially-oriented and mission-
directed research that generates new production technologies and products
First among the sources of this complementary relationship, is the intellectual
assistance that fundamental scientific knowledge (even that deriving from contributions made
long ago)  provides to applied researchers -- whether in the public or in the private sector. 
From the expanding knowledge-base it is possible to derive time- and cost-saving guidance
as to how best to proceed in searching for ways to achieve some pre-specified technical
objectives.  This raises the expected rates of return, and reduces the riskiness of investing in
applied R&D.  Harvard's physicist and historian of science, Gerald Holton
33 has remarked
recently that if intellectual property laws required all photoelectric devices to display a label
describing their origins, "it would list prominently: 'Einstein, Annalen der Physik 17(1905),
pp.132-148.'"  Such credits to Einstein also would have to be placed on many other practical
devices, including all lasers. Many important advances in instrumentation, and generic
techniques such as the use of restriction enzymes in “gene-splicing”also should be
mentioned.  These by-products of the exploratory, open-ended quest for fundamental34 Confusions about such comparisons are rife, but the matter is not difficult to
understand. The existence of a gap between the average social and the average private rate of
return on R&D does not necessarily signify that there is under-investment in research.  The
latter conclusion is warranted when there is a gap between the social and the private marginal
rate of return (i.e., the returns calculated on the last R&D project undertaken by the private
sector. Dr. Kealey has omitted notice of studies that document very large gaps between the
social rate of return on publicly-funded research and the social rates of return calculated on
company financed R&D.  One recent study, which he selects for discussions, is first cited
approvingly to show that basic academic research rarely generates advances that immediately
translate into commercially profitable innovations; but later is criticized extensively, in order
to cast doubt upon its conclusion that the social rate of return on academic research as a
whole is nonetheless high, and exceeds the opportunity cost rate of return available from
company-funded R&D. (pp. 216, 233-235, 304).
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scientific understanding also might be viewed as contributing to the “knowledge
infrastructure” required for efficient R&D aimed at commercially exploitable innovations. 
Occasionally they are immediately profitable and yield major economic payoffs for both
producers and users alike.  Even though coming few and far between, such "hits" have been 
potent enough to raise less than comprehensive estimates of the average social rate of return
on so-called "basic" academic research, pushing the latter well above the corresponding
private rates of return earned on applied, industrial R&D investments.
34  The experience of
the twentieth century also testifies to the many contributions of practical value that trace their
origins to large, government funded research projects which were focused upon the
development of new enabling technologies for public-mission agencies.  Consider just a few
recent examples from the  enormous and diverse range that could be instanced in this
connection: airline reservation systems, packet switching for high-speed telephone traffic, the
Internet communication protocols, the Global Positioning System, and computer simulation
methods for visualization of molecular structures -- which has been transforming the business
of designing new pharmaceutical products, and much else besides.
Yet, tracing the intellectual lineage of commercially successful innovations back to
their origins in exploratory and fundamental theoretical inquiries is misleading, in neglecting
the practical importance of establishing what does not work, and is not remotely possible. 
Sometimes the subsequent utility of exploratory sciences takes the form of providing
reasonably reliable guidance as to where to look first in applications-driven R&D, but, much
of the time the knowledge-base provides vital instructions as to where it will be useless to
look. The value of this is harder to quantify, but one might ask what it is worth to a venture35As reported in the International Herald Tribune, 25 June, 1996: p.1: "The Council
for Science and Technology, which is headed by the prime minister, called for the national
government to spend 17 trillion yen, or about $155 billion, on science and technology over
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capitalist to know that it is not a mistake to refuse to spend time talking with that persuasive
inventor who wants to tell her about a wonderful new idea for perpetual motion machines? 
Creative geniuses are often hard to distinguish from lunatics on first acquaintance.
The central point that is obscured by The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, and
therefore must be re-emphasized here, is that over the long-run the fundamental knowledge
and practical techniques developed in the pursuit of basic science serves to keep applied
R&D as profitable an investment for the firms in many industries as it has proved to be,
especially, during the past half-century. In this role, modern science continues in the tradition
of the precious, even if sometimes imprecise maps that guided parties of exploration in
earlier eras of discovery, and that of the geological surveys that were of such value to
prospectors searching for buried mineral wealth. 
That is not the end of the matter.  There is a second, and no less important source of
the complementary relationship between basic and applied research which has been totally
ignored by Dr. Kealey's book.  This is  the nexus between university research and the training
of researchers, on the one hand, and the linkage of the profitability of corporate R&D to the
quality and the knowledge of the people who are available to perform it, on the other hand. 
Seen from this angle, government funding of basic science conducted in the universities
today is providing vital subsidies to the R&D performed by the private business sector, not
taxing it, as Dr. Kealey contends (e.g., pp. 247-248).  Properly equipped research universities
have turned out to be the sites of choice for training the most creative and most competent
young scientists and engineers, as many a corporate director of research well knows.  This is
why graduates and postdoctoral students in those fields are sent, or find their own way to
university labs in the US, and still to some in the UK. It explains why businesses participate
(and sponsor) “industrial affiliates” programs at research universities; it is part of the reason
for US industrial research corporations’ broadly protective stance in regard to the federal
budget for basic science --which has escaped the most severe onslaughts by the
Representatives of Congress.  Acknowledgment of it has had a great deal to with the recent
announcement by the  Japanese government of a dramatic reversal of its former policies, and
the initiation of a vast programme of support for university-based basic and applied R&D.
35   the next five years....an increase of about 50 percent over...the last five years...The new plan's
"overall thrust is to revitalize research in universities and national research laboratories."
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The academic science sector not only trains the next generation of researchers with
the support of public monies; the universities also devise and supervise the variety of ways in
which their students' competence and displays of originality can be assessed and signaled --
free of charge to potential employers in private business sector, and, indeed, to prospective
users of research talent everywhere.  Moreover, in sending those students out into the world,
the universities actively transfer the latest techniques and findings of research that resist easy
codification for publication in the open scientific journals.  Think of the expense to private
firms, and the consequent effects on their calculated rates of return on R&D projects, were
they obliged to furnish all that overhead support for themselves! 
A Matter of Style
Something has to be said, after all else, about the author's style.  The pre-publication
blurbs describe this book as "entertaining" and "powerful.”  So it is, but, distressingly, for all
the wrong reasons.  The ambivalent wording of those blurbs, however, should be taken as a
warning:  a good read, and a ripping yarn are what we look for from spy thrillers and murder
mysteries, rather than in serious works on complex and fraught issues like the design of
science and technology policy.  In the latter we are certain to read about what may be seen on
the one hand, and on the other hand -- but not of gore on either of the proverbial economist’s
two hands.  Dr. Kealey delivers, however -- with a passionate prose style that is unhesitating,
unambiguous, and unnuanced.  The reader is carried along by the author’s tone, which
conveys total confidence that the over-simplifications and facile glosses that stud the text
have really settled the issues which were made to seem so difficult by confused and
inconclusive academic historians and social scientists. (pp. 334)
In the book’s extensive and lively narrative passages, assorted worthies are trooped
before the author’s reviewing stand to receive his praise or blame.  Successful entrepreneurs,
both past and present, not unexpectedly, are lauded without reservation.  Individual scientists
and engineers of distinction also receive nodding approval, as a rule, but sometimes for rather
surprisingly idiosyncratic reasons.  For example, the nineteenth century British metallurgist,
Robert Mushet, gets repeated favorable notices as an exemplar of "good industrial research"--36 One pertinent detail has been omitted in Dr. Kealey's explanation of his quixotic co-
optation of Einstein into the company of those to whom he awards the coyly patronizing title
"hobby scientist"-- including Darwin, Cavendish, and Peter Mitchell (the Nobel Laureate in
biochemistry).  That Zurich Patent Office post had been accepted by Einstein only out of
sheer financial desperation, following the failure of his father’s business enterprise, and the
many fruitless efforts by Einstein and his friends to find him a more suitable, academic
research appointment.  Those circumstances were therefore quite unlike those of this book's
author, who might properly be described as a research scientist whose professional
employments, academic and otherwise, have allowed him time to engage in "hobby science
policy."  In the Preface (p. xi), Dr. Kealey graciously thanks "colleagues in the group at the
lab [at Cambridge] for the beautiful research they have continued to produce while I have
been distracted by this book"; he adds that "without the support of my colleagues in the lab at
Cambridge, and also in Unilever, it would have been impossible to have pursued both my
science and this book."
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because of the paranoid extremes to which he went in guarding the secrecy of his alloy steel
experiments. (pp. 76-77, 250-251)  Albert Einstein also puts in a cameo appearance, being 
paraded along with Charles Darwin as a splendid example of "another academic failure [who]
was one of the greatest of hobby scientists."(p. 89)  "Hobbyist" status appears to have been
conferred in Einstein’s case by virtue of his employment as a clerk in the Zurich Patent
Office, whilst engaged in the researches leading to the special theory of relativity.
36
But, in this process of sorting out the sheep and the goats of history, there is no want
of subjects in whom the author can find only fault, and who therefore come in for derision or
censure. Thus,  Jean-Baptiste Colbert was a dirigiste Minister of State who died in 1683
"universally loathed" for impoverishing the French people by excessive taxation and
bureaucracy (p. 71);  Charles Babbage is "summed up" as "an incompetent" who squandered
government money, "a man who poured intense energy into bombastic conflict against
trifles." (pp. 80-81). Thomas Edison “was a horrible man,” caricatured as "a barely literate,
uneducated artisan" who learned on the job "[l]ike most of the great American engineering
pioneers."(p. 138)  Vannevar Bush, the war-time director of the U.S. Office of Scientific
Research and Development, whose report to President Roosevelt in 1945 successfully
advocated a peace-time program of expanded federal support for research universities as the
keystone of American science and technology policy, appears as a power-seeking
administrative careerist: Bush "of course,  had always wanted a federally funded national
research foundation through which he could initiate, fund and coordinate a vast peacetime
empire of pure science...."(p. 149) Joseph Needham is depicted in a  passing vignette as a37No mention is made in this passage of Needham's extensive travels China during his
1942-1945 posting as Scientific Counselor at the British Embassy in Chunking. As is the case
throughout the whole of his book, including the historical survey chapters, Dr. Kealey omits
any reference to the 15 volumes of Needham’s  Science and Civilization in China.
38 At this point the text (p.331) relents, but only momentarily: “Obviously, there are
individual exceptions to those generalisations, but no organisation fosters jealousy, bitterness
and envy like a modern university.” 
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"Marxist (of the Maoist persuasion) [who] dedicated his life to proving that Chinese science
had long been better than that of the West...[without] actually emigrating to China" (p. 177).
37
 Lord Robbins "was in fact trying to destroy the British tradition" of  higher education, and so
"has proved to be the greatest purveyor of anomie in British intellectual history." (p. 199)
Whatever virtues are discernable in the individual scientists and engineers sketched
by Dr. Kealey’s pen, none can be perceived in his collective portraits.  Britain's distinguished
scientists fare especially badly when hauled up before him in groups: Fellows of the Royal
Society, for their politicking in pursuit of honors, and their indolence thereafter, are chastised
with the translation of FRS as "Friends of the Right Sort", and "Further Research
Suspended." (pp. 334-335).  Past directors of the Medical Research Council are chided for
choosing to "depend on government handouts," rather saving British taxpayers' money by
patenting penicillin and monoclonal antibodies (pp. 136-137) -- as if to say that their policy
stance against patenting such research findings stemmed from sheer fiscal irresponsibility, or
some absurd fetish.  
The author's penchant for mass indictments, verdicts and sentencings, however, is not
confined to victims close to home. It ranges far and wide: Renaissance artists, indeed, all
artists, and literary and theatrical types, too, are" egomaniacal, promiscuous, downright silly"
-- the odd individual among them "can be tolerable, but as a group they are frightful." (p.
309) Intellectuals in general “are very Rouseausque. Like him, they feel superior to other
people....wallow in self-pity....are egotistical, selfish and mean.”
38  Economists specifically
are let off with only a comparatively mild scourging, as has been noticed: in Dr. Kealey’s
experience their concern is "to further their own professional importance" by finding fault
with the free market. (p. 215).  These summary judgements are dispensed no less readily in
the case of institutions, particularly the University of Wales: "the Welsh colleges have always
been the weakest institutions of higher education"; into their sorry condition, somehow made
manifest by the financial bankruptcy of University College Cardiff in the 1980s, readers are39 The quoted phrase is Churchill's, used exposing Macaulay's maligning of 
Malborough (Winston S. Churchill, Malborough, His Life and Times, vol. i (1934): p. 46). 
Nieves Mathews (Francis Bacon: The History of a Character Assassination, Yale University
Press, 1996) provides a thoroughly persuasive demonstration that these words apply with
equal justice to the Essay on Bacon (1837) -- another production from the same
untrustworthy pen. 
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told they will find "horrific insight"  by consulting none other than the account of Swansea in
Kingsley Amis’s  Lucky Jim (1954).  But, Dr. Kealey should not be thought biased in such
matters, for, his disparagements are distributed quite even-handedly and totally without
regard to national associations. The dismissal of the Welsh colleges is as nothing compared
to the moral condemnation reserved for the rest of British higher education (pp. 197-198):
having been, during the late 1960s and 1970s "in thrall to violence, promiscuity and Marxist
chic....caused by the Robbins expansion", the legacy of the chaos spawned in these
institutions has been  awful; Dr. Kealey thus finds (pp. 197-198)
"every reason to believe that the universities have not only failed to transmit 'a
common culture and common standards of citizenship' but that they have helped
brutalize their own society.  The intolerance, violence and drug abuse of the students'
unions will have legitimized, for many a young thug, direct action and brutality."
One does not have to read very far into this book before recognizing that in such
proceedings it bears some aspects reminiscent of the works of Thomas Babbington Macaulay
-- save for the sweep and grandeur of Macaulay’s narrative style.  An early clue to this is
provided by the opening chapter, wherein the author retails selected bits from Macaulay’s
infamous essay in defamation of the character of Francis Bacon, and describes that source in
a postscript simply as "hilarious." (p. 13)  It would have been bad enough had Dr. Kealey
contented himself with presenting Bacon’s philosophy in a distorted form calculated to
contrast it unfavorably with that of Adam Smith.  Why seek to further dim the brilliance and
originality of Bacon’s ideas concerning science and technology by repeating the gross
slanders perpetrated in Macaulay’s Essay on Bacon (1837)?  Nothing in that particular
"tissue of fraud and lies"
39 has the slightest logical bearing on the substance (or in substance)
of either Bacon’s, or Dr. Kealey’s views regarding the role of the State in the pursuit of
science.  But, in this book logic does not rule, and the author’s rhetorical method does not
balk at parroting past malignings of Bacon; they too can be enlisted in the campaign to
discredit all proponents of the (thoroughly Baconian) position that the public funding for the40 Quoted by Mathews, Francis Bacon (1996 ), p. 22.
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collaborative pursuit of scientific understanding of both the natural and the “made” world
will serve to further the material well-being of humanity, as well as to elevate the human
spirit.
Thomas Spedding, the patient and scrupulous nineteenth-century biographer of
Bacon, described Macaulay's "faculty of conveying the greatest amount of false effect with
the smallest amount of definite misstatement" as "an unconscious facility in him, more like
genius than any other faculty he possesses."
40  Alas, one cannot be so charitable even as to
offer Dr. Kealey the same accolade.  For, it has been seen that in the parts of his book that
treat historical matters, as well as in the application of econometric methods and economic
theory, there are all too many "definite misstatements."
It has been acknowledged that the economic arguments for public patronage of
scientific research often are poorly put, and that the political case for government funding of
increasingly costly science has to be grounded, ultimately, on satisfactorily answering
skeptics question about getting future economic value for money spent in pursuit of such
knowledge, rather than other worthy purposes.  But, this does not warrant mistaking a
demagogic assault for a constructive criticism; an informatively challenging analysis does not
consist in responding to the past explanatory failings on the part of the academic science
community by shouting "Off with their heads!"  Whatever the reviewers and blurb-writers
may have said, it cannot be a “courageous” or  truly "brave” book that systematically panders
to the common human weakness of smiling, and tolerating the telling of stories that blatantly
disregard the evidence -- because the author  has been divertingly cheeky in denigrating
commonly esteemed persons and institutions.  Nor does Dr. Kealey really deserve anyone's
tacit thanks for offering to the non-scientist academics among his readership the exquisite
satisfactions of Schadenfreude.  
One Man’s Warning
In the end I must be quite blunt: this is a thoroughly bad book, and the real worry of it
is that critical reviews, even ones more elaborate that this space affords, will not succeed in
consigning it to a well-deserved oblivion.  After all, in 1881, Thomas Spedding devoted a
thousand pages to righting the injustices done to the reputation of Francis Bacon by47
Macaulay's brief essay; and still, it has remained necessary in 1996 for Nieves Mathews to
give us another 560 pages, meticulously examining the origins and the continuing legacy of
that eminently readable piece of character assassination.
An old saying is too apposite here:  "A fool may throw a cow down a well, and yet six
wise men are not enough to get it out."  The cow in question -- in the shape of Dr. Kealey's
large and lively book -- is now a fait accompli, stuck firmly into the well of public debate,
where its utterances may reach and soon be echoed by others.  As a source, then, even if not
as an “authority," it is almost certain to find use by other polemicists of a radical laissez-faire
and mildly anti-academic disposition.  In such circumstances, the one course of action that
can best preserve the health of public policy discussion is to put up as many warnings as
possible around the site of The Economic Laws of Scientific Research.  Space for these will
be limited, so, my proposal for a suitably brief (mental) health notice has to be this: 
DANGER.  ROTTING COW IN THE WELL
Check Historical Statements Carefully and Discard the Econometrics .
Watch Out for Flawed Economic Logic.
Boil Other Contents Thoroughly Before Swallowing. 